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The False Hope of a Footnote: Arbitration
of Title VII Disputes After Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.
Three years ago a footnote appeared in the United States Su-
preme Court decision of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.' which
has provided a continuing source of controversy in the field of labor
arbitration. The Court's decision labeled the traditional arbitration
process an "inappropriate forum"' for the resolution of Title VII
disputes.' Therefore, arbitration of discrimination grievances does
not bar subsequent Title VII actions in federal court.4 However, in
the footnote the Court justified the continued use of arbitration by
authorizing trial courts to give weight to arbitration decisions. De-
ference to an arbitration ruling would depend on whether the anti-
discrimination provisions of the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment are substantially the same as Title VII, the fairness of the
1. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
2. Id. at 56.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000h (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000h (Supp.
111972) [hereinafter cited as Title VII]. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted
to prevent discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin by an employer,
labor organization, or employment agency. Section 2000e-2 provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail
or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individ-
ual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for member-
ship, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
4. 415 U.S. at 59-60.
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arbitration procedures, the sufficiency of the arbitration record, and
the special competence of the arbitrator.5
Since the Alexander decision many authorities have recognized
that traditional arbitration procedures cannot adequately protect a
grievant with a Title VII claim.' However, commentators are con-
cerned with the increasing burden placed upon the judiciary since
the enactment of Title VII. Therefore, much discussion has centered
around revising the arbitration process to accommodate effectively
Title VII claims.
This article will examine the traditional role arbitration has
played in labor relations and the strengths and weaknesses of the
post-Alexander views regarding the revision of the arbitration pro-
cess. The arbitrators' reactions to the Alexander footnote will be
examined along with the interpretation and application it has re-
ceived from the courts.
THE RISE OF ARBITRATION
The Supreme Court defined arbitration as "the means of solving
the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the
problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way
which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the
parties."7
Prior to the 1940's the grievance arbitration process was rarely
used.8 Between 1942 and 1945 the use of grievance arbitration accel-
erated due to the War Labor Board's attempt to stabilize produc-
tion.' Congress declared arbitration the desirable method for set-
tling grievances arising under collective bargaining agreements,,"
but consistently refrained from providing for federal enforcement of
these contracts." Congress finally supplied the necessary enforce-
5. Id. at 60 n.21.
6. See generally [19761 92 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 72; [1972] 92 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
177; Coulson, Title Seven Arbitration in Action, 27 LAB. L.J. 141 (1976); Edwards, Arbitration
of Employment Discrimination Cases: A Proposal for Employer and Union Representatives,
27 LAB. L.J. 265 (1976).
7. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
8. The infrequent use can be attributed to common law hostility toward arbitration.
Federal courts applied the common law rule that executory contracts providing for arbitration
are not specifically enforceable. Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 112 (1924).
9. The War Labor Board had a strong policy of ordering the adoption of contract clauses
providing for grievance arbitration. This policy stimulated the development of arbitration.
P. PR.sow & E. PETERS, ARBrATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONFLICT REsOLUTION IN
LA R RELATIONS 8-9 (1970).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
11. Nothing in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 authorized the National Labor
Relations Board to enforce such agreements, nor could the breach of a labor contract be
treated as an unfair labor practice.
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ment provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act.'2 Section 301 of this Act
provides that parties to a collective bargaining agreement can be
sued for contract violations in federal court.' 3
Within this statutory framework the Supreme Court decided
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills." Holding that the arbitra-
tion provisions in collective bargaining agreements are specifically
enforceable in federal court,'5 the Court laid a foundation for a sys-
tem of federal substantive law of arbitration under section 301.
The Supreme Court set forth the relationship between the arbi-
tration process and the courts in the Steelworkers Trilogy." The
Court outlined the scope of judicial treatment for cases involving
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement containing a
grievance arbitration procedure. A court's function is limited to
ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a
claim which on its face is governed by the contract. 7 In determining
whether an issue is covered by the arbitration clause, a court should
resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration.'" Furthermore, an arbitra-
tor's award must be enforced by a court even if the arbitrator's
interpretation of the contract is different from the court's or is am-
biguous.'9 The Steelworkers Trilogy recognizes a realistic division of
authority and expertise between the arbitrator and the courts, and
establishes a strong basis for judicial deference to arbitration
awards.
ARBITRATION AND TITLE VII
Although the arbitration process received the Supreme Court's
endorsement as the preferred method for resolving labor disputes,
reliance on arbitration for resolving Title VII issues creates special
problems. When a grievant's claim under a collective bargaining
agreement is based on the anti-discrimination clause of the con-
tract, an overlap exists between the grievance arbitration procedure
and the remedies available under Title VII. Although Title VII does
12. 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
14. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
15. Id. at 451.
16. The Steelworkers Trilogy is the popular name for three Supreme Court decisions
handed down on the same day involving the Steelworkers Union: United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
17. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
18. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960).
19. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1960).
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not speak directly to the use of arbitration in resolving claims of
employment discrimination, the legislative history manifests a con-
gressional intent to provide the individual with multiple remedies
against discrimination.20 Therefore, Congress left the courts the task
of defining the parameters of the relationship between Title VII and
arbitration .2
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 22 the Supreme Court unani-
mously agreed to limit the influence of arbitration awards in civil
rights matters governed by Title VII. The Court found that the
federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal
policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be
accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his
remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII." It noted
that arbitration is a comparatively inappropriate forum for the reso-
lution of rights created by Title VII,24 because the resolution of
statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of the
courts.
25
Notwithstanding its refusal to endorse a policy of absolute defer-
ence to'arbitration, the Court noted that the process has concilia-
tory, therapeutic effects26 and can be useful in resolving Title VII
claims. The Court explained that "where the collective-bargaining
agreement contains a non-discrimination clause similar to Title VII,
and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may
well produce a settlement satisfactory to both employer and em-
ployee. '" 1 A result satisfactory to both parties would end the dispute
20. In an interpretive memorandum introduced in the Senate, one of Title VIl's sponsors
stated that "Title VII is not intended to and does not deny to any individual, rights and
remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and state statutes." 110 Cong. Rec. 7207;
see 110 Cong. Rec. 13,650-52 (1964).
21. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander, the circuits were divided on the
issue of whether submission to final arbitration precluded an employee's right to a trial de
novo under Title VII. See, e.g., Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972) (a
federal court may, under limited circumstances, defer to a prior arbitration award); Dewey
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402
U.S. 689 (1971) (suit may not be brought in court after the grievance has been arbitrated);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (plaintiffs should be allowed to
seek a remedy through arbitration and in court provided no duplicative relief results).
22. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
23. Id. at 59-60.
24. Id. at 56.
25. Id. at 57.
26. Id. at 55.
27. Id.
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and avoid future litigation altogether.
The Alexander Court suggested that the arbitral decision may be
admitted as evidence in a subsequent trial and be accorded such
weight as a court deems appropriate.2 8 The footnote then stated that
where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an em-
ployee's Title VII rights, a court may accord it great weight. 9 While
giving no specific guidance to district courts for determining the
amount of weight to be given such awards, the Court listed four
factors it considered relevant. 0 They include "the existence of pro-
visions in the collective-bargaining agreement that conform sub-
stantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the
arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of
discrimination, and the special competence of particular
arbitrators."3'
Several factors may influence an employer and a grievant in their
decision to utilize an arbitration procedure which attempts to com-
ply with the criteria in the Alexander footnote. Obviously, the par-
ties hope to reach a satisfactory resolution of their dispute through
the arbitration process with its inherent benefits as a grievance
resolution mechanism. In addition, the factors listed in the
Alexander footnote provide grievants with safeguards that might
not otherwise exist in arbitration proceedings. Employers can also
benefit from the use of these stricter procedures. In the event the
grievant is not satisfied with the arbitration result and later sues
under Title VII, the arbitration proceeding conforming to the foot-
note is entitled to great weight from the courts.32 Thus, the employer
will be relieved of a full reconsideration of the issue.
Arbitrators' Reaction to Alexander
Various arbitration awards have resulted from procedures which
appear to be specific attempts by the parties to comply with the
standards promulgated by the Alexander footnote.33 In two recent
28. Id. at 60.
29. Id. at 60 n.21.
30. These factors are similar to the deferral standards advocated by the Fifth Circuit in
an earlier case, Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972), and are also
comparable to the deferral practices the National Labor Relations Board set forth in Spiel-
berg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955) and Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837
(1971).
31. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
32. Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc. and Teamsters Local 890, 64 Lab. Arb. 620, 621 (1975)
(Gould, Arb.); Gulf States Util. Co., 62 Lab. Arb. 1061, 1070 (1974) (Williams, Arb.).
33. See Weyerhaueser Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 874 (1975) (Barnhart, Arb.); Basic Vegetable
Prod., Inc. and Teamsters Local 890, 64 Lab. Arb. 620 (1975) (Gould, Arb.); Mountain States
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arbitration proceedings, contract provisions which incorporated
anti-discrimination provisions consistent with Title VII's mandate
were the subject of the arbitration.34 One of those contracts also
stated that any provision in the contract contrary to established
federal law is unenforceable. 35 In a third arbitration, the collective
bargaining agreement did not contain an anti-discrimination
clause, but since the grievant had alleged discrimination in addition
to his contract-based charges, the issue was addressed by the arbi-
trator. 36 In these test proceedings, the parties specifically provided
the arbitrators with authority to consider and apply relevant federal
law. 37 In arriving at their awards, the arbitrators gave full considera-
tion to Title VII and other relevant statutory and administrative
law.
The arbitrators also sought to provide the procedural fairness that
the footnote prescribed. For example, one arbitrator noted that
there had been eight days of testimony during the arbitration hear-
ing.38 In one instance, the grievant was represented by her own coun-
sel in addition to that provided by the union. 9 In another case, the
grievant did not have his own counsel, but the arbitrator com-
mended the union for its thorough representation of the grievant's
interests.40 The arbitration decisions were thorough, especially with
respect to the discrimination issues. In general, the arbitrators in
these grievance proceedings considered their training and profes-
sional experience sufficient to render them capable of hearing and
deciding employment discrimination cases."
Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 316 (1974) (Platt, Arb.); Gulf States Util. Co., 62 Lab. Arb.
1061 (1974) (Williams, Arb.).
34. Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc. and Teamsters Local 890, 64 Lab. Arb. 620, 621 (1975)
(Gould, Arb.); Mountain States Tel. & Tele Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 317, 318 (1974) (Platt, Arb.).
35. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 317, 324 (1974) (Platt, Arb.).
36. Gulf States Util. Co., 62 Lab. Arb. 1061 (1974) (Williams, Arb.).
37. Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc. and Teamsters Local 890, 64 Lab. Arb. 620, 621 (1975)
(Gould, Arb.). The arbitrators also found such authority and obligation to be clearly estab-
lished in the Alexander decision; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 317, 326
(1974) (Platt, Arb.); Gulf States Util. Co., 62 Lab. Arb. 1061, 1069 (1974) (Williams, Arb.).
38. Gulf States Util. Co., 62 Lab. Arb. 1061, 1067 (1974) (Williams, Arb.).
39. Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc. and Teamsters Local 890, 64 Lab. Arb. 620 (1975) (Gould,
Arb.).
40. Gulf States Util. Co., 62 Lab. Arb. 1061, 1091 (1974) (Williams, Arb.). The arbitrator
stated that "in fourteen years of arbitrating, the arbitrator has not seen a grievant as thor-
oughly defended and represented as in the subject case." Id.
41. Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc. and Teamsters Local 890, 64 Lab. Arb. 620, 621 (1975)
(Gould, Arb.); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 317, 326 (1974) (Platt, Arb.);
Gulf States Util. Co., 62 Lab. Arb. 1061, 1070 n.11 (1974) (Williams, Arb.).
His positive assumption in this area is based on more than twenty years of concern
for and experience with the problems of racial discrimination. Some of this experi-
ence includes heading a professional staff under a Department of Labor grant to
[Vol. 8
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Notwithstanding these few instances involving strict compliance
with the footnote, the majority of post-Alexander arbitration deci-
sions do not meet the standards set forth in the footnote. Conse-
quently, these awards would not be entitled to "great weight" in a
subsequent Title VII action. In these decisions the parties, the arbi-
trators, or sometimes both, demonstrate no desire to use the sug-
gested arbitration procedure. For example, arbitrators frequently
decide discrimination issues arising out of the bargaining agreement
without ever mentioning Title VII.42 Also, by restricting the arbitra-
tor's authority to the application of the contract, and by omitting a
Title VII-like provision, parties preclude consideration of Title VII
issues." Even when arbitrators are given the authority to apply
statutory law in determining the validity of a claim, many have
refrained from deciding the Title VII issue when there is no estab-
lished Title VII case law upon which to rely."
This widespread failure to rely on the Alexander footnote could
be due to its novelty and the consequent lack of judicial interpreta-
tion of the "great weight" standard. At this time, the increased costs
of the new arbitration system outweigh the still uncertain benefits.
study the employment problems of Blacks in the South and to develop positive
programs which would lead to equal employment opportunities for Blacks. The
same was true when he served as the first Director of the Manpower Division of the
Office of Economic Opportunity in Washington. He continues to consult in related
areas for DOL, HEW, and OEO. Through the years, he has conducted orientation
and training sessions for labor and management groups in regard to employment
and discrimination problems of Blacks. He has headed many research projects
related to the problem and has many publications including two books-one covers
the problems of Blacks in the labor force and the other traces the history of discrimi-
nation against Blacks in the South from the Civil War to the present.
Id.
Although the arbitrators stated that their training and professional experiences rendered
them competent, doubt has been expressed that these self-serving statements from the arbi-
trators themselves would be regarded very seriously by the courts. [19761 92 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 68, 70; see Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Discrimination: The Parties' Process and
the Public's Purposes, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 724 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc., 66 Lab. Arb. 421 (1976) (Liberman, Arb.); Intalco
Aluminum Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 155 (1976) (Burke, Arb.); ITT Rayonier, Inc., 65 Lab. Arb.
1122 (1975) (Hardy, Arb.); United States Steel Corp., 65 Lab. Arb. 626 (1975) (Friedman,
Arb.).
43. See, e.g., St. Regis Paper Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 802 (1975) (Young, Arb.).
44. See Hollander & Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 816 (1975) (Edelman, Rosenberg & Craig, Bd. of
Arb.). Where an employer asserted that performance of a contractual obligation to lay off
workers in reverse order of seniority would result in a possible violation of Title VII, the
arbitrator nonetheless found a violation of the labor contract. The Title VII case law in that
area was not sufficiently clear to be relied upon and the arbitrator was unwilling to interpret
Title VII on his own. He maintained that only the contract should be applied when conflicts
between the collective bargaining agreement and Title VII arise until the Supreme Court or
Congress decides which takes precedence. Id.
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Since the judicial refinement of these standards is still developing,
parties are more comfortable maintaining their established proce-
dures rather than experimenting in an untested area.
Judicial Interpretation and Application of Alexander
None of the arbitration awards which were decided pursuant to
the suggestions in the footnote have been relitigated in court. 5 How-
ever, arbitration of Title VII issues not employing the Alexander
suggestions has been subject to judicial interpretation. These deci-
sions indicate a strict adherence to the suggested guidelines. For
instance, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,4" an employee
appealed a district court decision contending that the court erred
in failing to give greater weight to the arbitration award in his favor.
The appellate court rejected his claim, pointing out that the con-
tractual right in question was not identical to the Title VII right and
that the arbitrator did not decide the Title VII issue. 4
7
In Pearson v. Western Electric Co.,4" an employee commenced
grievance procedures under the collective bargaining agreement and
later brought a Title VII action against the employer. While the suit
was pending the arbitration proceeding was settled. The grievant
was reinstated and received full back pay. The grievant then moved
for partial summary judgment claiming that the discrimination
issue had been resolved in the arbitration proceeding. The court
disagreed since nothing before the court indicated that the settle-
ment in the arbitration proceeding covered the same issues pre-
sented in the Title VII action. The arbitration award could, how-
ever, be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court
thought proper.49
Finally, in Dripps v. United Parcel Service, Inc. ,0 a district court
accorded an arbitrator's award "great weight,""' but not because of
satisfactory compliance with the footnote. Great weight was given
45. This lack of relitigation could be due in part to the fact that most of the arbitration
decisions were favorable to the grievants. Also, in Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc. and Teamsters
Local 890, 64 Lab. Arb. 620 (1975) (Gould, Arb.), the grievant waived her right to sue in
federal court.
46. 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The Fifth
Circuit was aware of the principles enunciated in Alexander and decided the case on those
grounds. Curiously, however, the court never specifically mentioned the Alexander decision.
47. Id. at 408-09; see Note, The Continuing Validity of Seniority Systems Under Title VII:
Sharing the Burden of Discrimination, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 882 (1977).
48. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1200 (D.C. Kan. 1976).
49. Id.
50. 381 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd without published opinion, 515 F.2d 506 (3rd
Cir. 1975).
51. Id. at 422.
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to the arbitration decision only after the court had adjudicated the
Title VII issue and found that its result was consistent with the prior
arbitration award. 2 It appears that the "great weight" referred to
by the court was certainly not the type anticipated in Alexander.
With few exceptions, the response to the footnote by parties to
arbitration can at best be characterized as cautious. Due to their
adherence to established arbitration systems, the courts have had
little opportunity to interpret and apply the Alexander footnote.
THE FUTURE OF TITLE VII ARBITRATION
Due to the present lack of judicial guidance, the scope of arbitra-
tion's role in determining Title VII issues still remains largely unde-
fined. The Alexander footnote is, however, a clear indication that
arbitration can play a positive role in resolving Title VII claims.
Many characteristics of arbitration make it a more desirable settle-
ment method than litigation. Private arbitration is a relatively in-
formal procedure compared to the procedurally complex judicial
process. Therefore, grievants may obtain dispute resolutions much
more quickly53 and at considerably less expense through arbitration
than through litigation. In addition, the arbitration process provides
grievants with the satisfaction of having their alleged wrongs de-
cided without suffering the emotional stress often accompanying
litigation.54 Not only will grievants with Title VII claims have a
quick, inexpensive determination of their charge, but employers will
also be relieved of the time and expense involved in defending a
court action.
However, as the Supreme Court warned, the informality which
makes arbitration an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means
for dispute resolution renders it a less appropriate forum for the
determination of statutory rights.55 The safeguards of the judicial
process should be provided in the enforcement of a grievant's right
to equal employment opportunity. Moreover, the additional safe-
guards necessary to cure arbitration's weaknesses would make it
more procedurally complex, expensive, and time consuming. 56
Despite this warning, the benefits inherent in the arbitration pro-
52. At the end of the court's opinion, it stated, "It is well to note that this conclusion is
consistent with the decision of Clair V. Duff, the arbitrator to whom the grievance was
submitted. The arbitrator's decision that forbidding the wearing of beards by welders is
justified on the basis of safety factors is entitled to great weight." Id. at 421-22.
53. The EEOC had a backlog of over 126,000 cases as of November, 1976, and it was
continuing to rise. [1976] 93 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 145.
54. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 58.
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cess have motivated arbitrators and lawyers to propose revisions to
the private arbitration system. They seek to fashion a process capa-
ble of accommodating Title VII disputes which will result in awards
entitled to "great weight." 57 The various proposed revisions are in
substantial agreement on many of their basic elements, including
the type of Title VII case suitable to arbitration, the type of proce-
dure which should be used, and the necessary qualifications of the
arbitrator.
Types of Cases Suitable for Arbitration
Alexander made it clear that not all types of Title VII violations
may be resolved effectively through the use of arbitration.18 There-
fore, commentators have attempted to define the characteristics of
an arbitrable Title VII charge." For example, if the arbitrator is
asked to decide a single issue in an area where the law is undisputed,
arbitration would be more appropriate than in those instances in-
volving complex or novel issues." With the former, the arbitrator
would have the benefit of established case law to rely upon in mak-
ing his decision. The latter type of case is more appropriate for
judicial resolution to enable the courts to guide the development of
the law.
Another factor to be considered is the number of claimants. Cases
involving fewer grievants are more suitable for arbitration since they
tend to be less complex and therefore more susceptible to a quick,
inexpensive determination." The courts are more experienced and
better equipped to handle the complexities of a large number of
claimants. In addition, arbitration is incapable of effectively accom-
modating the class action suits which often result from discrimina-
tion charges.2 Arbitration can only resolve disputes between those
employees presently employed and their employer. Class actions
many times encompass not only present employees but past em-
ployees or persons who were never even hired due to discriminatory
practices
In another situation the identity of the defending party can be an
important factor in determining the suitability of arbitration. Since
57. See generally [1976] 92 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 72; [1976] 92 LAB, REL. REP. (BNA)
177; Coulson, supra note 6; Edwards, supra note 6.
58. 415 U.S. at 55.
591 [19761 92 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 177, 178; Edwards, supra note 6 at 272.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The courts are more favorable to class actions in the employment discrimination field
than in other areas because the very nature of a Title VII claim is class based. [19761 92
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 357.
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an employee's grievance is processed for him exclusively by the
union, cases alleging unlawful acts of discrimination by both his
employer and his union, or simply against the union, should be
excluded from arbitration. 3 It would be impossible for an employee
to get a satisfactory resolution of a grievance when his charge is
against the very party assigned to represent him.
Suggested Procedures
Once the class of cases suited to the arbitration process is se-
lected, a special arbitration procedure should be established. This
process, preferably an expedited one," should be separate and dis-
tinct from other grievance procedures. 5 There is no need to burden
the traditional grievance machinery with the more technical re-
quirements of Title VII arbitration. As a bare minimum, the condi-
tions set forth in the Alexander footnote should be satisfied. 6 This
would include providing a complete record of the arbitration pro-
ceeding, furnishing a written statement of the arbitrator's findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and assuring that the anti-
discrimination clause in the contract is comparable to Title VII.Y1
It has been suggested that the grievant be allowed to use his own
counsel to present the case as opposed to the usual reliance on the
union. Although it tends to prolong the hearing and results in
increased cost, by providing his own counsel a grievant can be cer-
tain that his interests are being fully represented.
63. Edwards, supra note 6, at 273.
64. Id. at 275.
65. Id. at 272.
66. Id.
67. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
68. [1976] 92 LAB. EL. IP. (BNA) 177, 178; Coulson, supra note 6, at 145; Edwards,
supra note 6, at 275. This suggestion was followed in Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc. and Teams-
ters Local 890, 64 Lab. Arb. 620 (1975) (Gould, Arb.).
It is a recognized legal proposition that the union has the right to control the processing of
a grievance through arbitration and exclude the grievant's private counsel. However, in a
recent Supreme Court decision, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), a
union was found to have breached its duty of fair representation for what amounted to "bad
performance." The Court did not find that the union had proceeded in bad faith or in a
discriminatory manner. Its finding turned on the skill of the union with respect to the way it
had handled cross-examination of the witnesses. It appears that the union is not representing
the employee in the union's representative capacity, but as a lawyer for the grievant. After
Hines, there is a risk that a union's failure to have an arbitration case presented by an
attorney will be found to be a breach of the duty of fair representation. Giving the individual
the opportunity to be represented by his own counsel will avoid the problems which surfaced
in Hines. See generally Coulson, Vaca v. Sipes' Illegitimate Child: The Impact of Anchor
Motor Freight on the Finality Doctrine in Grievance Arbitration, 10 GA. L. Rv. 693 (1976).
69. However, it appears that existing practices are adequate. In response to a survey taken
by the President of the American Arbitration Association, nine arbitrators replied that labor
1977]
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The revised proceedings should include a provision by which the
parties expressly authorize the arbitrator to hear and to determine
the Title VII issues.70 Since labor arbitration was designed to inter-
pret private contractual rights, the parties are able to restrict the
scope of the arbitrator's authority through their contract.7 When
such restrictions limit the arbitrator to the application of the collec-
tive bargaining contract, most arbitrators will apply only the law of
the shop and will avoid consideration of Title VII. For example, in
St. Regis Paper Co.,"2 a grievant claimed she had been denied bene-
fits while she was absent due to pregnancy. The arbitrator denied
her claim but was careful to note that his decision was based solely
on the language of the collective bargaining agreement. He noted
that "[tlhis conclusion does not quite end the matter. Finding that
the grievant is not entitled to sickness and accident benefits under
the Agreement does not mean that she is not entitled to benefit from
another source, specifically Title VII. . . "I The arbitrator re-
frained from deciding the Title VII issue because he believed that
interpretation of federal law was not his proper function under the
contract. According to the arbitrator, he was empowered by the
parties to interpret only the language of the agreement and not to
add to it or to change it." To avoid this problem the revised proce-
dure should provide the arbitrator with the necessary authority to
address Title VII issues.
The revised procedure should enable the arbitrator to award the
grievant all relief available under Title VII.75 Traditional contrac-
tual remedies are often inadequate. 6 For example, an arbitrator can
organizations seldom provide adequate representation for grievants, 43 replied that unions
sometimes provide adequate representation, and 167 replied that representation is usually
adequate. Coulson, supra note 6, at 145.
70. Id. at 144; [19761 92 LAB. RE. REP. (BNA) 177, 178.
71. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
72. 65 Lab. Arb. 802 (1975) (Young, Arb.); accord, Lone Star Indus., Inc., 67 Lab. Arb.
709 (1976) (McKenna, Arb.).
73. St. Regis Paper Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 802, 803 (1975) (Young, Arb.).
74. Id.
75. Edwards, supra note 6, at 272. Title VII relief is provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(Supp. IV 1974):
(g) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
See also Ashton, The Availability of Preliminary Injunctive Relief to Private Plaintiffs Pend-
ing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Action Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 51 (1976).
76. Coulson, supra note 6, at 150.
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issue an award but cannot assure compliance. Courts, hovever, are
empowered under Title VII to issue injunctions." The Alexander
decision allows both successful and unsuccessful grievants to bring
suit in court when full relief was not obtained through arbitration. 8
Therefore, to alleviate the problem of inadequate remedies leading
to relitigation, the arbitrator should be given the authority to award
all appropriate remedies.
Alexander declared that mere resort to the arbitral forum does not
constitute a waiver of an individual's Title VII rights.79 Further,
neither the union nor the employee can prospectively waive these
rights. 0 The right to equal employment opportunity conferred by
Title VII is a private right which may not be bargained away by
unions in their contract with the employer.8 However, the
Alexander Court recognized the possibility that an employee may,
under certain circumstances, voluntarily and knowingly agree to
settle a claim of employment discrimination and thereby waive his
right to pursue a Title VII action in federal court.82 An effective
waiver would completely foreclose the possibility of this claim ever
being relitigated. Therefore, it has been suggested that the revised
procedure should incorporate a waiver provision that could be vol-
untarily and knowingly signed by a grievant selecting arbitration. 3
Since prospective waivers are ineffective, the grievant would have
to waive his right to sue in federal court only after this right had
accrued.
Such a waiver provision was signed by the grievant in Basic Vege-
table Products, Inc. and Teamsters Local 89084 as a prerequisite to
the arbitration procedure. The alternative to arbitration was a court
remedy at the grievant's own expense. Even though this waiver was
never tested in court, there remains some question as to its valid-
ity.85 A degree of economic coercion is present when an employee
must choose between the relatively inexpensive arbitration machi-
nery as opposed to the costly judicial process. Therefore, such a
waiver might not meet the validity standards of "voluntary and
knowing."
77. See note 75 supra.
78. 415 U.S. at 51 n.14.
79. Id. at 52.
80. Id. at 51.
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 52 n.15.
83. Coulson, supra note 6, at 145.
84. 64 Lab. Arb. 620 (1975) (Gould, Arb.).
85. Note, The Potential of Expanded Arbitration in Resolving Title VII Claims In Light
of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and New Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Policy, 7 Loy. Cm. L.J. 334, 341-42 (1976).
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If the grievant voluntarily selects arbitration and additionally
files a Title VII complaint, it has been suggested that the employer
should be able to refuse to arbitrate.8 6 By allowing this, an employer
will be relieved of the burden of defending the same action in two
forums. However, if the union agrees to the employer's withdrawal
from arbitration there is a possibility that the union will have
breached its duty of fair representation. 7 This duty with regard to
employment discrimination cases has been defined as requiring the
union to assert the rights of its minority members and not to accept
passively practices which discriminate against them.8 Positive as-
sertion of those rights would probably prohibit union acquiescence
to an employer's refusal to arbitrate.
Competence of the Arbitrator
In addition to these procedural safeguards, the Alexander foot-
note emphasized the need for an arbitrator with special competence
to decide employment discrimination cases. At present, much con-
troversy exists over whether arbitrators have the technical expertise
to decide job discrimination issues governed by Title VII.55 One
attorney contends that arbitrators are as competent to address Title
VII issues as many federal judges. 0 An arbitrator maintains that
assurance of arbitral competence in the employment discrimination
area requires special training of arbitrators."
Opponents of these positions contend that arbitrators are not pro-
fessionally competent in the field of federal discrimination law and
should not receive Title VII training. 3 If employment discrimina-
tion issues are heard in arbitration, arbitrators would be addressing
breaches of federal civil rights law as well as breaches of contract.
Permitting an arbitrator to interpret federal statutes would mean
delegating to him the power of a court. Although arbitrators are
regarded as experts in the law of the shop,' they are not necessarily
86. Edwards, supra note 6, at 275.
87. Id. at 266. The standards for the union's duty of fair representation are not clearly
defined. See note 68 supra.
88. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 314 (6th Cir. 1975).
89. Professor Bernard Meltzer, among others, maintains that arbitrators should not be
permitted to interpret federal statutes because they lack the institutional competence to
address the significant public policy questions raised. [1976] 92 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 68;
see Meltzer, supra note 41, at 730-38.
90. See remarks of attorney James Youngdahl in [1976] 92 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 177-
78.
91. See remarks of Earle Brown, Regional Director of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, in Cleveland. Id.
92. Coulson, supra note 6.
93. [1976] 93 LAB. R. REP. (BNA) 41.
94. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
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regarded as having special competence in federal civil rights. The
interpretation and application of Title VII requires expertise in fed-
eral substantive law, which requires the special competence of the
courts. 5 A national public policy on discrimination should be devel-
oped by the courts and should not be the creation of privately se-
lected decision-makers."
INHERENT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF TITLE VII ARBITRATION
Since a grievant can elect to arbitrate his claim and retain the
right to sue in court, employers might be discouraged from entering
into collective bargaining agreements providing for the arbitration
of Title VII claims. However, there are several advantages to the
employer pursuing arbitration. First, even though the employee re-
tains his statutory right to sue, there is a greater possibility that he
will not pursue that remedy after arbitration. 7 Second, the cost of
even an expanded arbitration procedure will be less than litigation
and the final disposition of the case will be reached much more
quickly. Finally, by using arbitration an employer will have the
opportunity to become aware of and to correct any discriminatory
practices in his plant before they reach a stage where litigation is
the employee's only answer.
The proposed revisions to the arbitration process increase its po-
tential as an effective Title VII forum. However, several weaknesses
remain in the system that cannot be easily overcome.
Grievants have the power to prescribe the boundaries of the issues
to be arbitrated. A grievant's wish not to have his statutory rights
decided by arbitration limits the arbitrator to contract interpreta-
tion notwithstanding an employer's desire to have the charge de-
cided under Title VII." This limitation on the scope of the issues
95. Id.
96. The EEOC recently indicated its stance in the arbitration-Title VII controversy when
it decided not to proceed with a proposed pilot project to test the use of arbitration techniques
in resolving employment discrimination charges. Under the abandoned proposal, the EEOC
would have contracted with the American Arbitration Association to train arbitrators to
decide Title VII disputes. [19761 93 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 41.
97. 415 U.S. at 55.
98. Hollander & Co., 64 Lab. Arb. 816 (1975) (Edelman, Rosenberg & Craig, Bd. of Arb.).
99. This power appears to be one-sided. In Whitfield Tank Lines, Inc., 62 Lab. Arb. 934
(1974) (Cohen, Arb.), an employee alleged that his discharge was motivated by racial discrim-
ination. The employer denied the charge, but suggested that in light of Alexander it would
not be inappropriate for the arbitrator to ignore the issue since his decision would not be final
and binding on either party. The arbitrator declined the invitation to bypass the charge for
two reasons. First, the union had alleged discrimination and asked for arbitration. Secondly,
Alexander did not completely abandon the use of arbitration in the case of disputes involving
discrimination. Although the relationship between arbitration and Title VII is in an unsettled
state, this arbitrator felt that it would be premature to abandon the use of arbitration.
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could force the employer to defend what is basically the same dis-
pute in two forums. There is no effective way to guard against this
traditional limitation of the arbitration process. The revised arbitra-
tion systems will have to gain the confidence of employees so that
they will prefer to arbitrate their employment discrimination claims
rather than resort to the courts.
Another problem arises from the philosophy of certain arbitrators
that a contract incorporates all applicable state and federal law.100
Therefore, even when Title VII is not mirrored in the bargaining
agreement, it is sometimes used as a guide to dispute settlement.'10
These arbitrators believe that equal employment opportunity is the
law of the shop, as well as the law of the land. Accordingly, arbitra-
tors should not wait for direction from the courts or governmental
agencies before taking action. 02 This approach can only lead to
inconsistencies and conflict.
One arbitrator decided an unsettled issue of Title VII law based
on the applicable EEOC guidelines. 103 While recognizing that the
guidelines are not binding on the courts, the arbitrator stated they
constitute law in absence of judicial weight of authority to the con-
trary.' 4 In a later case, the Supreme Court decided the issue con-
trary to both the EEOC guidelines and the arbitrator's ruling. 105
This inconsistency emphasizes the fact that courts cannot and
should not be second guessed. The federal judiciary is the final,
supreme authority with respect to federal law and it must remain
in that position.
Those parties who use a revised arbitration process to decide em-
ployment discrimination charges are seeking to eliminate subse-
quent Title VII court action. If such an action is commenced, the
parties at least hope the court will find the arbitration decision to
be entitled to "great weight." For the revised systems to be success-
ful, the courts must so find, thereby rendering full litigation unnec-
essary. As of yet, there is no indication the courts will move in that
direction. Therefore, the parties to revised Title VII arbitration have
nothing concrete to rely on other than the footnote in Alexander.
100. See FSC Paper Corp., 65 Lab. Arb. 25, 27 (1975) (Marshall, Arb.).
101. See, e.g., WLS Stamping Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 584 (1976) (Emerson, Arb.); Adams
County School Dist. 14, 66 Lab. Arb. 180 (1976) (Hayes, Arb.); Northrop Corp., 65 Lab. Arb.
400 (1975) (Rose, Arb.).
102. [19761 92 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 177.
103. Walled Lake Consol. Schools, 64 Lab. Arb. 239 (1974) (McCormick, Arb.) (decided
that exclusion of pregnancy-maternity disability from paid sick leave constituted sex discrim-
ination).
104. Id. at 243.
105. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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CONCLUSION
Many of the trouble spots confronting Title VII arbitration can be
resolved through prudent decision-making in the federal courts. The
judicial process moves slowly and the courts are still in the early
stages of interpreting and applying Title VII. Although a significant
number of Title VII issues have been decided by the courts, it will
be years before the law in that area comes close to being settled.
Once the law becomes established, arbitrators will have precedent
to look to in making their decisions. As arbitrators become more
experienced with Title VII, employees will have more confidence in
the system. When more arbitration decisions in compliance with the
Alexander footnote find their way into the courts, the impact of the
footnote can be accurately assessed.
Although time can cure some weaknesses, arbitration can never
provide the effective Title VII forum many hoped it could. The
traditional arbitration process must be extensively revised to enable
it effectively to accommodate Title VII claims. Even the revised
systems are limited with respect to the type of Title VII case they
are capable of addressing. Once a proper case is processed through
an appropriate procedure, the decision must be made by an arbitra-
tor with special competence. Only when these strict requirements
are met will the courts be entitled to afford great weight to these
arbitration decisions. These numerous complexities surrounding
Title VII arbitration clearly outweigh the limited benefits. The Su-
preme Court acted wisely when it relegated the relationship be-
tween the arbitration system and Title VII rights to a footnote.
LAURENE KUCERA JANIK
1977]
